ECC Memory for Fault Tolerant RISC-V Processors by Dörflinger, Alexander et al.
This is an author produced version of :
Article:
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-202105041412-0
ECC Memory for Fault Tolerant RISC-V
Processors
Alexander Dörflinger1, Yejun Guan1, Sören Michalik2, Sönke Michalik2, Jamin
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Abstract. Numerous processor cores based on the popular RISC-V In-
struction Set Architecture have been developed in the past few years
and are freely available. The same applies for RISC-V ecosystems that
allow to implement System-on-Chips with RISC-V processors on ASICs
or FPGAs. However, so far only very little concepts and implementations
for fault tolerant RISC-V processors are existing. This inhibits the use of
RISC-V for safety-critical applications (as in the automotive domain) or
within radiation environments (as in the aerospace domain). This work
enhances the existing implementations Rocket and BOOM with a generic
Error Correction Code (ECC) protected memory as a first step towards
fault tolerance. The impact of the ECC additions on performance and
resource utilization are discussed.
Keywords: BOOM · Cache · Error Correction Code · Fault Injection ·
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1 Introduction
The free and open RISC-V Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) has attracted
an active community building processor cores and ecosystems, which makes it
competitive to established processor designs. There is a strong growth forecast
for the number of RISC-V cores in industrial-, consumer-, and other areas [13].
However, there are only a few approaches of fault-tolerant RISC-V designs for
safety-critical and radiation-tolerant applications, which would open its use for
the automotive and areospace domain. An exploitation of this market potential
requires compliance with corresponding safety standards.
Mitigation of transient faults is one important mechanism for fault-tolerant
electronics. ISO26262 [10] names error detection to increase the diagnostic cov-
erage, which is required for electronics of higher safety levels. Furthermore,
aerospace systems operating in environments with increased radiation levels are
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subject to non-destructive Single Event Effects (SEEs). An effective mitigation
technique for hereby caused soft errors in memories are again error correction
(and detection) codes [8]. Therefore, this paper will present how existing RISC-V
implementations can be enhanced with Error Correction Codes (ECCs).
Contribution: This work devises and implements a highly configurable ECC
protection for memory structures within RISC-V processor systems. Some ECC
implementations are already existing for RISC-V designs. However, they cover
only parts of the memory structures of a processor core and/or are limited to
small low-power solutions with processing power restrictions. The generic and
configurable ECC approach of this work targets also large RISC-V cores for high
performance computing and fully covers all memory structures. This prepares
RISC-V for its use in safety-critical applications and radiation-intense environ-
ments. Together with further fault tolerance mechanisms (e.g., lockstep opera-
tion or other redundancy schemes), high performance RISC-V systems could be
made available for the automotive and aerospace domain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 presents existing fault
tolerance concepts for RISC-V processors and Sect. 3 gives an introduction to
the Chipyard3 framework used within this work. A detailed description of the
new ECC concept follows in Sect. 4. Results of its implementation are presented
in Sect. 5.
2 Related Work
The SHAKTI-F design [9] mitigates SEEs by combining ECC with re-computation
techniques. It features a relatively small 5-stage in-order microprocessor. How-
ever, its development has been discontinued and it is not maintained within
the current SHAKTI-C class core anymore. Fault tolerance of caches, typically
representing the largest and hence most susceptible memory structures within a
processor system, is not addressed. The Klessydra microprocessor [4] based on
PULPino4 is a configurable 2 to 4-stage RISC-V implementation. Several time-
and space redundancy techniques have been applied for fault tolerance. Again,
error protection for larger memory structures has not been addressed yet.
Apart from SHAKTI-F and Klessydra (being free and open), some propri-
etary implementations are available targeting space applications. Microsemi (Mi-
crochip Technology Inc.) offers the Mi-V5 ecosystem, which allows to instantiate
RISC-V cores on their radiation tolerant FPGAs. Cobham Gaisler released the
64 bit NOEL-V6 soft-core recently. However, just as the LEON3/4 processor, it
is not fault tolerant by design; fault tolerant versions are built from radiation
hardened standard cell libraries and are hence bound to specific technologies.
Just as the LEON3/4 based System-on-Chips (SoCs) GR712 [5] and GR740 [6],






NOEL-V uses write-through and no-write allocate cache policies. This guaran-
tees that an erroneous cache line can be corrected by fetching its copy from a
higher memory hierarchy level at any time. It makes an error correction code
dispensable, because an error detection (e.g., parity bit) suffices. However, the
hereby utilized write policies typically yield lower performance than write-back
and write allocate.
The Rocket and BOOM RISC-V cores by UC Berkeley implement write-back
and write allocate cache policies and are partly equipped with optional ECC. A
Single Error Correction Double Error Detection (SEC-DED) code protects the
caches of the SiFive U-series IPs (U54, U74) and SoC (FU540), which utilize the
5-stage in-order Rocket processor core. The BROOM tapeout [2] adds resilience
methods to the 7-stage out-of-order BOOMv2 processor. Several techniques tol-
erate hard bit errors in L1 and L2 caches, which allows an aggressive reduction
of the core voltage. However, the approach requires to know the position of er-
roneous bits beforehand (e.g. by running a built-in self-test). Hence, it cannot
correct soft errors at arbitrary bit positions and does not increase fault tolerance.
3 Rocket and BOOM Processor Cores within Chipyard
The Chipyard framework developed by UC Berkeley bundles RISC-V cores, pe-
ripherals, software compilers, simulators, and further tools for SoC development.
It targets both FPGA implementations and ASIC design. Hardware components
are programmed in the Chisel hardware description language (HDL). Chisel is
based on object-oriented Scala and adds hardware construction primitives. Fre-
quently utilized hardware elements are collected in a Chisel standard library
(e.g., multiplexers, arbiters, counters, FIFO queues, etc.). As a modern pro-
gramming language, it offers high abstraction, re-usability, and parameterization
options. Compared to well-established HDLs such as Verilog and VHDL, the in-
creased abstraction level results in a higher line of code efficiency and speeds up
development times. However, it also adds complexity to simulation and netlist
generation: Chisel code has to be compiled into an intermediate circuit repre-
sentation (FIRRTL) before it is transformed into synthesizable Verilog.
Chipyard integrates two RISC-V implementations, which are both highly
configurable. The 5-stage in-order Rocket core [1] offers both 32 and 64 bit reg-
ister file widths, several branch prediction options, arbitrary cache sizes, and
optional ISA extensions (MAFD). The core provides three privilege levels, ad-
dresses virtual memory, and is capable to boot Linux. Rocket is already equipped
with the ECC options Parity, SEC, and SEC-DED for both L1I$ and L1D$ (tag
and data each) which can be activated with limitations. Rocket provides block-
ing and non-blocking versions for the L1D$. The non-blocking version allows
hit-under-miss requests, which enables the in-order processor to execute further
instructions until the load data is used. However, this powerful non-blocking
L1D$ variant does not support ECC in its tag field at all, and its implementa-
tion in the data field results in compile errors (several versions up to the current
v1.3 have been tested without success).
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Chipyard allows an easy replacement of the Rocket core with the 7-stage
superscalar out-of-order BOOM core [3]. The instruction fetch unit is equipped
with complex predictors (e.g., GShare). A tapeout in TSMC 28 nm achieved
1.0 GHz and a Coremark of 3.77 per MHz [2], which makes BOOM one of the
best performing RISC-V implementations. The BOOM utilizes the non-blocking
L1D$ version of the Rocket, hence it is afflicted with the same ECC problems as
described above. The L1I$ does not support any ECC implementation. Further
resilience methods have been applied to the BOOM implementation [2]. However,
they only target static hard errors and cannot mitigate arbitrary soft errors.
The cache resilience works on Rocket and BOOM are promising but not
complete. ECC has been successfully applied only to the Rocket core, with
restrictions. Memory structures apart from caches such as Branch Prediction
Unit (BPU) tables and the Page Table Walker (PTW) are not protected. So far,
the BOOM core lacks ECC protection for memories completely. Those gaps are
be closed in this work using a generic ECC memory described in the following
section. The generic design makes it easy to apply it to all memory structures
and is not limited to L1 caches. This work concentrates on the ECC integration
in Rocket and BOOM; however, the parameterizable ECC memory interface
allows to migrate the approach to other RISC-V implementations as well.
4 Generic Error Correcting Memory Component
4.1 ECC Memory Requirements
Within the Rocket core only caches and one BPU table are implemented as
memory arrays; all other buffers are mapped to registers due to their small size.
This results in a small number of memory arrays ranging from 4 to 11, depending
on the Rocket core configuration (Table 1). The more complex BOOM core
additionally implements several buffers of the BPU and the PTW as memory
arrays, due to their increased size. This results in 18 to 38 memory arrays within
the BOOM core, depending on its configuration. The BOOM Small and Medium
configuration differ mainly by their issue width; however, memory sizes and
organization are very similar. The same applies for differences between Large
and Mega configurations.
Table 1: Number of Memory Arrays for Selected Rocket and BOOM Configurations
Core Configuration L1I$ L1D$ BPU PTW Sum
Rocket (Tiny) 2 2 0 0 4
Rocket (Big) 5 5 1 0 11
BOOM (Small) 5 5 7 1 18
BOOM (Medium) 5 5 7 1 18
BOOM (Large) 17 9 11 1 38
BOOM (Mega) 17 9 11 1 38
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Enhancing all those memory arrays with ECC protection separately requires
multiple and far-reaching code changes. For the Rocket core with FIRRTL trans-
formation and simulation times ranging from 10 to 21 minutes7, this would be
still feasible. However, the BOOM core generation and simulation takes up to 185
minutes, making a custom ECC adaption of each memory array very laborious.
Hence, a generic ECC memory component has been developed separately, which
can simply replace existing arrays and keeps the integration effort minimal.
The access scheme (e.g., single/dual-ported) and array organization (e.g., row
of words) differs for each array, which has to be considered during the generic
ECC memory development. Hereby the newly created ECCmem component goes
beyond existing IP such as Synopsis DesignWare STAR ECC IP, the ARM Arti-
san embedded memory IP, and Xilinx ECC IP [14]. It is technology independent,
i.e. not bound to any FPGA family or ASIC process, and additionally mitigates
error accumulation, which is not addressed in any of the existing solutions.
4.2 ECCmem Component
Fig. 1 depicts the overall ECCmem architecture. Dashed blocks are instanti-
ated depending on configuration settings. The IOs read/write request and
response make use of Chisel’s Decoupled interface, wrapping the data vectors
with a ready-valid pair. This interface abstraction allows a simple replacement



































Fig. 1: Configurable ECCmem Component
Depending on the capabilities of the selected ECC option, single and double
errors are signaled through dedicated outputs (serr, derr) and tracked in error
counter registers. Statistics on soft errors can be retrieved from further debug
counters containing the number of read/write accesses, fault injection-, and error
correction events. When relying on this error statistic information, reads from
uninitialized data have to be precluded as they may result in inadvertent error
7 Depending on its configuration; measured for run-bmark-tests on Intel i5-6500
3.20 GHz, 48 GB RAM.
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-202105041412-0
events. One solution is to initialize the complete memory at boot time (applied
e.g. to the BOOM data cache tag array in general). Another option is to set the
kill signal, canceling read accesses to uninitialized data in subsequent clock
cycles. This is a feasible solution for e.g. cache data arrays, because the initial-
ization information can be retrieved from the coherency flags one clock cycle
after issuing the read access.
Listing 1.1 gives an overview of the parameterization options of the ECCmem
module, which satisfy the diverse requirements of memory arrays within the
Rocket and BOOM implementations. The object oriented Chisel programming
language makes it easy to handle the parameterization. Some ports of the EC-
Cmem component are conditional (depending on the configuration), which is not
supported by other HDLs.
Scala 1.1: ECCmem Parameterization
class ECCmemParams(
ecc_code: Code = SECDEDCode,
reg_enc_input: Boolean = false,
reg_enc_output: Boolen = false,
reg_dec_input: Boolean = false,
reg_dec_output: Boolean = false,
depth: UInt = 1024,
row_format: Vec[UInt],
block_size: Int = 8,
interleaving: Boolean = false,
single_ported: Boolean = false,
correction_buffer: UInt = 0,
scrubbing: Boolean = false,
scrubbing_interval: UInt = 4,
fault_injection: Boolean = false,
name: String
)
Encoding and Decoding The ecc code parameter allows to select different
detection/correction codes. The current implementation supports the algorithms
none, parity, and hamming codes (SEC, SEC-DED). Hsiao codes could be added
in future for reduced area and delay overheads. Several reg * options allow to
insert registers at encoder/decoder inputs and outputs, which can be used to
relax timing. In particular, the decoding path can result in long signal latencies,
which may require corresponding register insertion.
Array Organization The parameters depth, row format, and block size de-
fine the array organization (Fig. 2). The read/write data may be partitioned
into several words within a row. Individual words may be accessed using a
read/write mask. A word can be further divided into blocks, which allows ar-
bitrary ECC widths. This facilitates a fine-grained balancing of area overhead
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and encoding/decoding latency: the smaller the block size, the smaller its en-
coding/decoding latencies, but the higher its area overhead. Each block contains
the original data and ECC bits being grouped together. The interleaving op-
tion shuffles bits of different blocks. It mitigates SEEs causing multi-bit errors
in neighboring cells, because the erroneous bits will be spread across different
blocks. This feature has been tested on RTL; however verification of its effect
after place and route has not been completed yet. With the single ported
option, the memory type can be selected. By default, a dual ported memory
will be generated (e.g. required for BOOM data cache). Arrays with exclusive
read/write access (e.g. BOOM instruction cache) benefit from the optimized










Fig. 2: ECCmem Array Organization
Correction Buffer With the current ECC implementations (parity, SEC, SEC-
DED), two or more accumulated errors cannot be corrected, and depending on
the selected ECC algorithm, not even detected. When using codes with single
error correction capabilities, the corrected data can be written back to memory.
Any correction buffer size greater 0 enables this error correction option. It
mitigates error accumulation, because a single error typically gets corrected be-
fore a second SEE strikes the same block. In order to minimize the impact on
the overall system, write back accesses are assigned with a lower priority than
read and write requests. The corrected word is stored within a correction buffer
until there is no concurrent write access (and in case of single-ported memory
no concurrent read access). Corrected data must not overwrite updated data.
Therefore, an entry within the correction buffer gets cleared once it senses a
regular write access to the same memory address as the destination of corrected
data. Once the correction buffer writes its content back to memory, the soft error
has been removed. This error correction process typically completes before de-
tection of a second error in another arbitrary word being read. However, systems
with high read/write loads (i.e. long retention times in the correction buffer) and
high expected error rates, may use a correction buffer depth of > 1.
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Scrubbing In the past, only very small numbers of SEE-caused soft errors were
expected in on-chip memories such as caches of earth-bound applications, hence
error accumulation has not been an issue [12]. However, the soft error rate in-
creases exponentially with voltage decrease, and error accumulation has to be
considered when relying on new technologies [7]. Furthermore, space applications
can be exposed to multiple SEEs within minutes [11], depending on the FPGA
or ASIC technology and the mission region. When operating under such condi-
tions, the interval of system read accesses to memory arrays is not sufficient for
preventing error accumulation. This applies for caches in particular: Cache line
access patterns are hardly predictable, which increases the probability of error
accumulation for less frequently accessed data regions.
To overcome this problem, the optional scrubbing option regularly reads the
complete memory array, and guarantees a minimum interval of single bit error
corrections. Again, the scrubbing mechanism is assigned with a lower priority
than read requests (and write requests in case of single-ported memory) to elimi-
nate any negative performance impact on the overall system. As depicted in Fig.
1, the scrubbing block generates continuous read accesses to memory. Once the
decoding block detects a correctable error in one of the reads triggered by the
scrubbing block, the corrected data will be passed to the correction buffer which
handles the write back to memory. In order to prevent an overflow, a full cor-
rection buffer forces the scrubbing process to pause. Scrubbing adds high load
on the read port of the memory, which can increase the power consumption.
This effect can be limited by setting the scrubbing interval, which defines
together with the operating frequency and memory depth the scrubbing period
(Equation 1). When setting the scrubbing interval to 0, the ECCmem com-
ponent attempts to scrub the memory as fast as possible. In this case Equation
1 gives only a lower bound of the scrubbing period, because any load on read




















stalled scrubbing accesses = 0 1 0
1 2 3 4
Fig. 3: Distributing Scrubbing Accesses in Time
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Scrubbing accesses are distributed evenly in time for a balanced load dis-
tribution. To achieve this, a scrubbing counter decrements by 1 each clock
cycle and triggers a scrubbing access to the next memory row once it hits 0
( 1© in Fig. 3). A scrubbing access increments the counter again by the defined
scrubbing interval. Higher priority accesses (read/write requests) delay the
scrubbing access 2©. Multiple high priority accesses could cause the scrubbing
counter to underflow, which is prevented by stalling the scrubbing access 3©.
Stalled accesses are executed as soon as no other high priority access blocks the
memory port 4©.
Fault Injection The fault injection option allows sporadic injection of er-
rors into already encoded data (containing both data- and ECC bits) when
writing to memory. This feature is used to test the functionality of the ECC,
correction buffer, scrubbing, and debug counters. It further allows to simulate
the processor behavior under SEEs, which can replace expensive radiation tests
to some extent.
5 Evaluation
All memory arrays of the Rocket and BOOM implementations have been re-
placed with the ECCmem component described in Sect. 4. The integration did
not require any far reaching changes, because the read/write request and
response interfaces allowed a simple mapping to existing memories. The kill
signal (compare Sect. 4.2) is generated correctly for all memories by determin-
ing the status of the memory content (initialized / uninitialized). The ECCmem
component is designed to have no effect on system performance (except when
inserting additional register stages with a reg * option). Both the write back
of corrected data and the scrubbing mechanism are low prioritized, preventing
to thwart read/write accesses. This has been verified running benchmark tests
in simulation8 for various Rocket and BOOM configurations (Table 2). Results
for the Dhrystone benchmark are identical before and after integration of the
ECCmem component.







8 Using verilator, https://www.veripool.org/wiki/verilator.
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Due to the similarity of the Small/Medium and Large/Mega variants regard-
ing memory size and organization (Table 1), resource utilization results will be
discussed for the Small and Mega configurations only, but apply for the Medium
and Large variants respectively. Fig. 4 summarizes the resource utilization of
BOOM implementations on the Xilinx Virtex UltraScale+ VCU118 evaluation
board and the respective overhead for ECC protection. The ECC protected
BOOM variants instantiate the ECCmem component with SEC-DED code for
all memory arrays.



























Fig. 4: Resource Utilization of Small- and Mega BOOM Configurations on a Xilinx
Virtex UltraScale+ XCVU9P FPGA with and without ECC protection
The resource overhead for ECC protected BOOM variants to original BOOM
implementations is calculated in Table 3. It shows moderate overhead for logic
(5.31%) and registers (3.44%) on average, but a large increase of RAM resources
(41.68%). As expected, the ECC memory protection has no effect on DSP uti-
lization.
Table 3: Resource Overhead of ECC protection for Different BOOM Configurations
Resource Overhead of
Core Configuration LUT Register BRAM DSP
BOOM (small) 7.50% 3.47% 42.11% 0%
BOOM (mega) 3.11% 3.41% 41.25% 0%
average 5.31% 3.44% 41.68% 0%
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Fig. 5 depicts the RAM size for caches and other memory arrays within the
BOOM implementation with and without ECC protection, which has been re-
trieved from the array sizes of the generated Verilog code. The overhead of RAM
resources depends on the selected ECC block size. For the BOOM configura-
tions, the block size has been limited to 26 bits for all memories, which adds
a maximum of 6 parity bits to each block. The block size can be only as large
as the memory word size. Hence, very small word sizes result in high area over-
heads, as it is the case for e.g. the Branch Target Buffer Bimodal Predictor table
(BTB bim) with 1 bit words. In this case, applying TMR to this array is a more





















































Fig. 5: ECC BRAM Overhead for Individual Memories
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a generic solution to enhance existing RISC-V pro-
cessor core implementations with ECC protected memory. When selecting codes
with error correction capabilities, error accumulation is mitigated by writing cor-
rected data back to memory. Applying a scrubbing mechanism further reduces
probabilities of error accumulation. As a reference implementation, all memory
structures within the Rocket and BOOM cores have been replaced by the newly
developed ECC protected memory. Logic and register overheads for the ECC
protection are small, while RAM resource usage increases as expected for the
applied hamming codes. Future work will complete the fault tolerance mecha-
nisms for RISC-V processors by applying further redundancy techniques, which
enables the use of RISC-V for safety-critical applications and the aerospace do-
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